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Response to Sim et al.  
Dark nudges and sludge from alcohol industry-funded organizations: We still need to “Be 
Aware of Drinkaware” 
 
We thank Dr. Sim and colleagues for their reply.  Industry funding of research and health 
information campaigns, including through intermediary bodies, is an area of growing 
research and we welcome this opportunity for discussion about the issue. In the interest of 
transparency, we wish to emphasise the ideas and evidence that inform our research, as 
these considerations can too quickly be overlooked when the debate is narrowed down to a 
particular issue about any given manuscript. As a research group constituted of public 
health researchers and medical doctors we are first and foremost dedicated to contributing 
to addressing the harms of alcohol use, a major global health problem that continues to be a 
leading cause of morbidity and mortality in high, middle and low income countries.1  We 
also believe that the provision of health information is a form of public health intervention, 
and as such it must be based on robust independent evidence, overseen by strong systems 
of governance not compromised by conflicts of interests, and held to high standards - 
including being subjected to external independent review.  
Our research is also informed by decades of evidence detailing how industries, particularly 
those which profit from the production, marketing and sale of harmful products, expend 
considerable resources carefully monitoring, influencing, and managing what is known 
about the harms of their products. 2 They also seek to counter evidence that threatens their 
profits and power. This influence is exerted through many diverse channels and employs 
elaborate strategies.2,3 It is within this context that we conduct our research, and advocate 
for the importance of ensuring that any information that is provided in the interest of 
promoting public health maintains evidential integrity along the entire path from initial 
development to final publication. This understanding must lead those who take part in the 
dissemination of such information to ensure that this path is transparent and open to 
scrutiny. It also requires that health professionals acknowledge the threat that harmful 
industry influence poses to health information, and take action to protect the integrity of 
that information - including recognition that these biases, distortions and misinformation 
may be subtle and sometimes even unconsciously introduced by those involved. 
In this context we find it disappointing that, as independent medical advisors, they do not 
engage with any of the substantive findings nor with the evidence we cited supporting the 
need for this study,  nor with the implications of our findings.4 Instead, their response 
appears to be largely confined to defending the reputation of Drinkaware, with whom they 
have previously been co- authors.5  
Even if Drinkaware is formally independent of the alcohol industry that funds it, its 
messaging and information materials consistently align closely with the misinformation and 
framings used by other alcohol industry (AI)-funded organizations, and by alcohol industry 
companies themselves.6,7 This includes strategically ambiguous messaging, omissions and 
mixed messages over alcohol-related cancers, particular breast cancer, as shown 
previously.8,9 10 Drinkaware’s misinformation on pregnancy-related alcohol harms is also 
consistent with misinformation from other AI-funded organisations, as noted previously. 
11,12   
The use of marketing-style messages from AI Corporate Social Responsibility bodies has also 
been shown before, and Drinkaware uses similar mixed messages.13  Given Sim et al.’s 
interest in comparative studies, we refer them to our analysis of the Twitter feeds of 
Drinkaware and other AI-funded bodies, in which we compared non-AI-funded bodies with 
AI funded bodies, including Drinkware.13  The study found that AI-funded bodies are 
significantly less likely to tweet about alcohol harms, about the influence of marketing and 
advertising, about cancers, and about regulatory measures addressing pricing and 
advertising restrictions, among others (See Table 2 below, reproduced from the paper). AI-
funded organizations were also, like Drinkaware, less likely to tweet about the impact of 
drinking on the emergency services. We note again however that in analysing 
misinformation there is no logical need for comparison with other organisations. Analyses of 
tobacco industry documents, or other misinformation, do not logically require such 
approaches. Our current analysis is not an epidemiological study but a documentary 
analysis. We explain this in detail in our paper. 
 
Why might it be, then, that AI-funded charities spread misinformation about serious alcohol 
harms, and are surprisingly coy about certain key topics, including the role of alcohol 
advertising and marketing? It comes down, of course, to conflicts of interest, the 
importance of which Sim et al. dispute. The alcohol industry is reliant on levels of sales that 
are consistent with drinking at harmful levels for a significant proportion of its overall 
revenue.14 15 It therefore has a clear conflict of interest with respect to reducing 
consumption levels, and there is substantial evidence that such conflicts guide both 
corporate political activity and corporate social responsibility activities, such as funding 
charities.16 17 
Sim et al. also cite Gray et al.’s comments on conflicts of interest, in support of their 
argument. They have omitted a key part of the context. Our commentary on Gray et al.’s 
paper 18 pointed out that they had misrepresented their own conflicts of interest, 
particularly their alcohol industry funding, and had placed the relevant statements in the 
supplement where readers are unlikely to see them, despite the journal guidelines.18  It is 
remarkable that Sim et al. seem to agree that alcohol industry funding does not represent 
an important conflict of interest when writing about alcohol – particularly the harms and 




Table below reproduced from “Alcohol Industry CSR Organisations: What Can Their 
Twitter Activity Tell Us about Their Independence and Their Priorities? A Comparative 






We stand by our statement that “…in the case of AI misinformation or disinformation we 
also need to consider the role of clinicians and others involved in advising these 
organizations, and whether this is consistent with their professional codes of ethics”. This is 
one of many lessons which public health has learned from the history of the tobacco 
industry. It is well-documented that the tobacco industry were and are dependent on 
clinical and other experts to provide cover for their disinformation, as part of 
“healthwashing” campaigns.19 Other harmful industries, including parts of the food and 
beverage industries, and the fossil fuel industry, have done the same.2,20  To reduce the risk 
to public health it is therefore crucial to consider how industry-funded structures, and 
strategic partnerships with legitimate experts, may enable the propagation of 
misinformation. The evidence of the tobacco and other harmful industries shows us clearly 
that these structures include industry-funded consultants and advisors, who may 
themselves be unaware of the extent of the supporting role they play.21 19 
 
We therefore again encourage Sim et al. to consider where the misinformation and 
industry-friendly framings are introduced, despite their involvement as expert advisors.6 8,9 
12 They may also wish to consider whether their advice is sufficient, as opposed to 
independent and transparent scrutiny of Drinkaware’s materials and processes.  
 
In short, repeated analyses have shown that alcohol industry-funded charities are a vector 
of industry-friendly misinformation. These are not ‘allegations’ as Sim et al. call them. These 
are consistent, replicated peer-reviewed scientific findings. Sim and colleagues’ reply 
ignores the fundamental problem of Drinkaware’s misinformation. In the words of a 




1. Collaborators GA. Alcohol use and burden for 195 countries and territories, 1990–2016: a 
systematic analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study. Lancet 2018; 392(10152): P1015-35. 
2. Michaels D. The Triumph of Doubt: Dark Money and the Science of Deception: Oxford 
University Press; 2020. 
3. Oreskes N, Conway E. Merchants of doubt: How a Handful of Scientists Obscured the Truth 
on Issues from Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming. London: Bloomsbury; 2012. 
4. Petticrew M, Maani N, Rutter H, Pettigrew L, Van Schalkwyk M. Dark Nudges and Sludge in 
Big Alcohol: Behavioral Economics, Cognitive Biases, and Alcohol Industry Corporate Social 
Responsibility. Milbank Q 2020; First published: 15 September 2020 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0009.12475. 
5. Larsen  J, Wallace  P, Sim  F, et al. Accuracy of alcohol and breast cancer risk information on 
Drinkaware's website. Drug Alcohol Rev 2018; 37(3): 304-6. 
6. McCambridge J, Kypri K, Miller P, Hawkins B, Hastings G. Be aware of Drinkaware. Addiction 
2013; 109(4): 1-6. doi:10.1111/add.12356. 
7. Mialon M, McCambridge J. Alcohol industry corporate social responsibility initiatives and 
harmful drinking: a systematic review. Eur J Public Health 2018; 28(4): 664-73. 
8. Petticrew M, Maani Hessari N, Knai C, Weiderpass E. How alcohol industry organisations 
mislead the public about alcohol and cancer. Drug and Alcohol Review 2017; 44(May): 15-7. 
9. Petticrew M, Maani Hessari N, Knai C, Weiderpass E. The strategies of alcohol industry 
SAPROs: Inaccurate information, misleading language and the use of confounders to downplay and 
misrepresent the risk of cancer. Drug and Alcohol Review 2018; 37(3): 313-5. 
10. Jackson N, Dixon R. The practice of the alcohol industry as health educator: a critique. NZ 
Med J 2020; 133. 
11. Koplin J. Revised DrinkWise posters use clumsy language to dampen alcohol warnings. The 
Conversation, August 18th 2018; Available at: http://theconversation.com/revised-drinkwise-
posters-use-clumsy-language-to-dampen-alcohol-warnings-102406. 
12. Lim A, Van Schalkwyk M, Maani Hessari N, MP P. Pregnancy, Fertility, Breastfeeding, and 
Alcohol Consumption: An Analysis of Framing and Completeness of Information Disseminated by 
Alcohol Industry–Funded Organizations. Journal of Studies on Alcohol and Drugs 2019; 80(5): 524–
33. 
13. Maani Hessari N, Schalkwyk M, Thomas S, Petticrew M. Alcohol Industry CSR Organisations: 
What Can Their Twitter Activity Tell Us about Their Independence and Their Priorities? A 
Comparative Analysis. Int J Environ Res Public Health 2019; 16(5): 892. 
14. Bhattacharya A, Angus C, Pryce R, Holmes J, Brennan A, Meier P. How dependent is the 
alcohol industry on heavy drinking in England? Addiction 2018; 113(12): 2225-32. 
15. Casswell S, Callinan S, Chaiyasong S, et al. How the alcohol industry relies on harmful use of 
alcohol and works to protect its profits. Drug Alcohol Rev 2016; 35(6): 661-4. 
16. Casswell S. Vested interests in addiction research and policy. Why do we not see the 
corporate interests of the alcohol industry as clearly as we see those of the tobacco industry? 
Addiction 2013; 108: 680-5. 
17. Marks J. The perils of partnership. Oxford: OUP; 2019. 
18. Petticrew M, Fitzgerald N, Maani N, McCambridge J, Pettigrew S, Van Schalkwyk M. 
Responsible Drinking, Conflicts of Interest, and the Elephant in the Room: A Commentary on A 
Scoping Review of “Responsible Drinking” Interventions by Gray, Williams & Shaffer (2020). Health 
Commun 2020: Published online: 28 Sep 2020. https://doi.org/10.1080/10410236.2020.1827541. 
19. Proctor R. Golden Holocaust: Origins of the Cigarette Catastrophe and the Case for Abolition: 
University of California Press. Berkeley, California; 2011. 
20. Michaels D. Doubt is their product: How Industry's Assault on Science Threatens Your 
Health: Oxford University Press; 2008. 
21. Glantz S, editor. The Cigarette Papers England: University of California Press, Ltd; 1996. 
 
